Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered Conservation Corporations by Coplan, Karl S
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-2001
Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered
Conservation Corporations
Karl S. Coplan
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, kcoplan@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karl S. Coplan, Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered Conservation Corporations, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F.183 (2001),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/360/.
DIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING FOR 
CHARTERED CONSERVATION 4 
CORPORATIONS 
In 1972, in Sierra Club v. Morton,' the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the Sierra Club's attempt to assert Article I11 standing . 
under the Administrative Procedure Act based on its own corporate 
interest in environmental issues. The Court suggested instead that an 
environmental organization must rely on its ability to represent the 
environmental interests of its individual members. Since Morton, no 
environmental organization has been successful in asserting its own 
corporate interest in environmental resources as the basis for Article 
111 standing in environmental litigation. For the most part, public in- 
terest environmental organizations have given up trying to assert di- 
rect environmental interests, relying instead on organizational stand- 
ing as representatives of their affected members. Courts have 
routinely inquired into the individual standing interests asserted by 
organizational  plaintiff^.^ But, in recent years, this representational 
standing hurdle has become harder and harder to clear, as courts have 
demanded ever more detailed showings of individual injury and cau- 
sation. 
Entities asserting direct business interests have fared far better in 
the courts. Most recently, in Bennett v. Spear: the Supreme Court 
upheld the statutory and constitutional standing of ranchers to chal- 
lenge a habitat conservation plan adopted under the Endangered 
Species Acts4 Courts have likewise recognized standing under the en- 
vironmental laws for business corporations asserting economic inter- 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Co-Director, Pace Envi- 
ronmental Litigation Clinic, Inc.; B.A., Middlebury College, 1980; J.D., Columbia University, 
1984. 
1. 405U.S.727 (1972). 
2 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F3d 149 (4th 
Ci. 2000). 
3. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
4. See id. at 172-74. 
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ests.' These courts have not conducted any inquiry into the individual 
interest of corporate shareholders; the corporate entities' business in- 
terests were found to be ~ufficient.~ 
This article suggests that, as an antidote to the ever-tightening 
restrictions on individual environmental standing, a state may charter 
a not-for-profit corporation organized to protect a particular envi- 
ronmental resource, giving the corporation a non-exclusive portion of 
the State's interest in enforcing applicable environmental protections. 
The dichotomy between not-for-profit organizations that may litigate 
only as the representative of individual members' interests, and busi- 
ness corporations that assert their own direct economic interests, may 
seem natural to our late-twentieth-century sensibility, but is not 
founded in original intent. The framers of Article 111, which grants 
jurisdiction over "cases and controversies" to the federal courts, 
would have seen the latter day business corporation as something of 
an oddity. Most incorporated entities during the eighteenth century 
were religious institutions, municipalities, and government franchi- 
sees. In fact, the now ubiquitous business corporation did not be- 
come commonplace until the early nineteenth century, as government 
franchise corporations expanded to include incorporation of private 
businesses.' To the framers, then, the concept of a corporate entity 
asserting community interests in natural resources on its own behalf 
would have been no more alien than the concept of a corporate entity 
asserting private business interests. 
A line of cases suggests that states and municipalities have 
standing to assert environmental interests within their jurisdiction 
without reference to individual standing or injury on the part of any 
particular re~ident.~ And, state-chartered corporations have long 
been delegated functions and powers originally residing in state gov- 
ernment.9 It follows that a state-chartered organization should have 
Article I11 standing to assert its own interest in protecting environ- 
mental resources directly, without reference to the individual inter- 
ests of its members. 
5. See Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058,1063 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(finding standing for aluminum and hydropower industries under the Endangered Species Act). 
6. See id. at 1066. 
7. See RONALD SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 
1784-1855: BROADENING THE CONCEE'T OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION 
(1982). 
8. See infra Part 1V.A. 
9. See infra Part 1V.B. 
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I. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: A DETOUR FROM 
DIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING AFTER 
SIERRA CLUB V. MORTON 
The litigation choices made by the Sierra Club in Sierra Club v. 
Morton, the first environmental standing case to reach the Supreme 
Court, established the path for all environmental citizen plaintiffs. By 
choosing to rely on its general interest in environmental issues na- 
tionally, rather than its particular corporate interest in the Sierra Ne- 
vada mountains, Sierra Club provoked a Supreme Court precedent 
that all but rejected the assertion of a non-profit corporation's direct 
environmental interests.'' With the Court's Morton decision blocking 
the direct road to environmental standing for organizations, these 
plaintiffs took the convenient detour through representational 
standing. In 1977, the Supreme Court established an easily met test 
for representational standing that, in part, relied on the individual 
standing of the organization's members." Indirect standing based on 
the interests of members rather than corporate interest proved expe- 
dient for the following two decades of environmental litigation. 
More recently, however, representational standing has proven 
more and more difficult to establish. The federal courts, following 
the United States Supreme Court's lead in its 1992 decision in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife,'2 have made it more difficult to show individ- 
ual members' standing by imposing ever stricter requirements for es- 
tablishing the Article I11 requirement of "injury in fact." Some courts 
have been receptive to attacks on environmental organization's rep- 
resentative capacity as well, inquiring closely into the relationship be- 
tween the organizational plaintiff and its members with standing. 
These restrictions on standing threaten to defeat Congress' plan of 
citizen environmental enforcement as a backstop to government en- 
forcement of federal environmental laws.13 
A. Morton and the Rejection of Standing Based on Abstract 
Environmental Issues 
In 1965, the United States Forest Service invited bids from pri- 
vate developers for the development of a ski resort in the Mineral 
King area of the Sequoia National Forest, an undeveloped wilderness. 
10. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
11. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
13. See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 35-37 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356. 
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Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. responded with a proposal to build a 
complex of ski trails and lifts, motels, restaurants, pools, and a cog 
railway, all designed to accommodate 14,000 visitors a day. The For- 
est Service gave Disney preliminary approval and permits to survey 
the area in preparation for a master development plan.14 
The Sierra Club was, as it is today, a national environmental or- 
ganization. Founded in 1892, its mission is to "to explore, enjoy, and 
protect the wild places of the Earth."" Sierra Club was an active op- 
ponent of the Mineral King development. When the Forest Service 
gave its approval to the Disney development bid, Sierra Club chal- 
lenged the approval in federal district court. In these P ~ ~ - N E P A ' ~  
days, Sierra Club challenged the authority of the'Forest Service to 
grant leases and approvals under various provisions of the statutes 
governing use of the national forests. Sierra Club supported its 
standing to sue with allegations based primarily on its status as a na- 
tional environmental organization. Its complaint asserted: 
For many years the Sierra Club by its activities and conduct has ex- 
hibited a special interest in the conservation and sound mainte- 
nance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the coun- 
try, regularly serving as a responsible representative of persons 
similarly interested. One of the principal purposes of the Sierra 
Club is to protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra 
Nevada ~ountains . '~  
The District Court found these standing allegations sufficient, 
and found sufficient doubt in the legality of the Forest Service's ap- 
provals to grant a preliminary injunction against further permits and 
approvals pending the litigation. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed, noting that there was "no allegation in the com- 
plaint that members of the Sierra Club would be affected by the ac- 
tions of [the Forest Service] other than the fact that the actions are 
personally displeasing or distasteful to 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's 
dismissal in its seminal decision on environmental standing. Justice 
Stewart's opinion for the majority cleared the path for environmental 
standing generally, by recognizing non-economic interests as a suffi- 
cient basis for Article I11 "injury in fact:" 
14. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 729. 
15. Sierra Club, Sierra Club Policies (visited Oct. 18,2000), 
<http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/>. 
16. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 8 4321 et seq. (1994). 
17. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8. 
18. See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24,33 (9th Cir. 1970). 
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Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, 
are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and 
the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the 
many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of le- 
gal protection through the judicial process.'g 
The majority nonetheless blocked Sierra Club's claim of standing 
based solely on the organization's general interest in environmental 
issues. While recognizing that the Mineral King development would 
wreak environmental injury on someone, according to the Court, Si- 
erra Club had not shown that it was itself "among the injured."1° The 
Court noted Sierra Club's specific refusal to rely on the possible indi- 
vidual interests of its members for the purposes of the appeal." The 
Court rejected decisions in some circuit courts recognizing standing of 
non-profit organizations to assert the public interest." Instead, the 
Court established as the constitutional minimum under Article III a 
requirement of "individual" injury. The majority assumed that, at 
least for the Sierra Club, the font of that individual injury must be the 
interests of its members, and not its own corporate interests. 
Justice Douglas's dissent in Morton is at least as memorable as 
the majority opinion, for its suggestion that environmental resources 
themselves-the very rocks, trees, rivers, and forests-should have 
standing to sue in their own name in federal court, much as ships have 
standing to sue as libellants in admiralty." Justice Douglas even drew 
the analogy to historical corporate entities, such as the ecclesiastical 
"corporation sole," that were given a fictional legal personality to 
permit suit in the Nevertheless, Justice Douglas was not that 
far removed from the majority about the question of who should have 
standing to speak for the forests and rivers in court; he also would 
rely on the use of the environmental resources by individual members 
of an organizational plaintiff. Using the river as the paradigmatic en- 
vironmental resource, he wrote: "Those people who have a meaning- 
ful relationship to that body of water-whether it be a fisherman, a 
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger-must be able to speak for the val- 
19. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. at 735. 
22. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Cornrn'n, 354 F.2d 
608 (2d Ci. 1965) (finding that environmental groups had standing to assert their special inter- 
ests under the Federal Power Act). 
23. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
24. See id. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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ues which the river represents and which are threatened with destruc- 
tion."= Noting the Sierra Club's allegation that its principal purpose 
was to "protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra Ne- 
vada Mountains," Justice Douglas seems to have presumed that this 
meaningful relationship test was satisfied, and would have found 
standing.26 
There is common ground between the majority and dissent in 
Morton. The majority recognized that environmental and aesthetic 
interests satisfied the "injury in fact" requirements of Article I11 
standing, but would require specific allegations that members of a 
plaintiff organization personally and individually suffered such inju- 
ries. Justice Douglas likewise recognized that environmental interests 
constituted "injury in fact," but was willing to go one step further to 
recognize the standing of the environmental resources themselves. 
However, Justice Douglas, like the majority, assumed the need for 
some natural person2' with a meaningful relationship to the environ- 
mental resource, to serve as its spokesperson. There is unspoken 
agreement between the majority and the dissent that corporate per- 
sons do not suffer direct environmental injury, but serve only as liti- 
gating conduits for the environmental interests of their members. 
The Morton Court thus assumed, without deciding, that incorpo- 
rated environmental organizations would not have any corporate en- 
vironmental interests to assert directly. It is easy to posit a situation 
where a not-for-profit might irrefutably have such interests, as when 
it owns real property that has been directly affected by environmental 
pollution. But such a case begs the question, as the environmental 
injury in such a case is also an economic injury.= A property dam- 
aged by environmental pollution is worth less money. The unspoken 
assumption of Morton and other cases is that, for Article I11 injury, 
corporate interests (even of the not-for-profit variety) amount to 
economic interests only. As we will see, this is not borne out by the 
history of corporations, either in this country or in England. Never- 
theless, since Morton, the Supreme Court has not had to address the 
possibility of direct environmental injury claimed by an environ- 
mental non-profit organization. The question simply has not arisen 
25. Id. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
26. See id. at 744 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
27. I am using "natural person" here in the sense of a non-corporate person. 
28. Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,365 (1982) (finding that a drain on 
organizational resources, but not an interference with organizational mission, supports stand- 
ing). 
Heinonline - -  12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 188 2001-2002 
Fall 20011 DIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING 189 
because, for the most part, environmental organizations have found it 
more expedient to follow the Court's cue, and to rely on the envi- 
ronmental interests of their members. 
B. The Detour Through Representational Standing and the 
Representational Standing Test 
Since the Morton decision, most organizational environmental 
plaintiffs have relied on the individual standing of their members, and 
the representative capacity of the organization, to establish standing 
to sue. Thus, in the next environmental standing case to reach the 
Supreme Court, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP)," the organizational plaintiff relied on 
the alleged injuries flowing from increased rail freight rates to its 
members who used forests in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area 
for "camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational pur- 
poses."M At the pleading stage, the Supreme Court affirmed a deci- 
sion approving the standing of SCRAP. 
Following the Morton and SCRAP decisions, there are precious 
few reported decisions in which environmental organizations sought 
to rely on their own interests to support standing, and none where 
they were successful. In one of these few cases, Sierra Club v. SCM 
31 Corp., the Sierra Club again sought to assert standing based on its 
own organizational interest in environmental issues. The Sierra Club 
argued that the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act3' ex- 
panded the standing available to organizational plaintiffs. The Sec- 
ond Circuit made short work of this argument, relying on Morton to 
reject the Sierra Club's persistent claim that its interest and expertise 
in environmental issues established its standing apart from the recrea- 
tional or environmental interests of its members.33 
More recently, the federal District Court for the Central District 
of Illinois rejected an attempt to prosecute a site clean-up action un- 
der the imminent and substantial endangerment provision of the Re- 
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)34 brought by Citi- 
29. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
30. See id. at 678. 
31. 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984). 
32. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. Q 1365 (1994). 
33. See SCM Corp., 747 F.2d at 102. 
34. 42 U.S.C. Q 6901 (1994). 
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zens for a Better Environment (CBE) "on its own behalf."" Like Si- 
erra Club, CBE relied on its organizational interest in preserving en- 
vironmental values, and, also like Sierra Club, was unsuccessful. Ac- 
cording to the court: "CBE has not offered any evidence, or even 
addressed in any of its various memoranda, how it, as an organization, 
has suffered anything more than a mere setback to its abstract social 
interests. Therefore, CBE cannot sue on its own behalf."36 
In cases where organizations have sought to rely on both their 
own organizational interests and the individual interests of their 
members, they have been successful only in the latter." Most organ- 
izational plaintiffs rely simply and exclusively on the individual 
standing of their members. 
For the most part, this detour into representational standing 
proved a smooth ride for the environmental organizations. The Su- 
preme Court established a three-part test for representational stand- 
ing in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comrni~sion:~~ 
Thus we have recognized that an association has standing to bring 
suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would other- 
wise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) 
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the par- 
ticipation of individual members in the lawsuit.39 
The second and third of these requirements never posed any problem 
for organizational environmental plaintiffs. The environmental inter- 
ests they sought to litigate were uniformly "germane" to the purposes 
of the organization, and the kinds of suits they brought, typically 
seeking injunctive relief or penalties, but not individual damages, did 
not require individual participation by their members. 
35. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Caterpillar, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060 (C.D. Ill. 
1998). 
36. Id. at 1061. Several courts have also rejected claims of direct "informational injury" as 
a basis of standing by environmental organizations. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown 
Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting standing for FOE in Clean Water 
Act citizen suit); Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79,84 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reject- 
ing informational claim under the environmental impact statement requirement of the National 
Environmental Policy Act). These decisions are highly questionable in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision last term in Akins v. Federal Election Commission, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), which 
held that where Congress created a right to information, any person claiming a desire to have 
such information has standing to litigate. 
37. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440,446 
(D. Md. 1985). 
38. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
39. Id. at 343. 
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Nor did the showing that individual members of the organization 
would have standing in their own right pose any significant obstacle 
to organizational standing in the first two decades of environmental 
litigation after Morton. Courts were routinely satisfied by allegations 
or afidavits establishing recreational use of the affected environ- 
mental resource by members of the organizational plaintiff. Thus, the 
Second Circuit found suficient for standing allegations that one 
member regularly passed the Hudson River and "finds the pollution 
in the river offensive to [his] aesthetic values'' and that another mem- 
ber's "children swim in the river, . . . occasionally fish0 in the river 
and his family has and will continue to picnic along the ri~er."~" 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found sufficient allegations that one of 
the plaintifE's members regularly hiked along the river into which the 
defendant's industrial discharges flowed.41 
For example, in a Clean Water Act citizens' enforcement suit 
brought by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation (CBF), the Maryland 
District Court found: 
The three members of CBF who have submitted affidavits have in- 
dicated that they use and enjoy the Patapsco River and other areas 
of the Chesapeake Bay water system. CBF itself is a regional envi- 
ronmental organization with many members who are residents of 
Maryland. Undoubtedly, many more than the three named indi- 
$duals use and enjoy the Chesapeake Bay, but CBF has chosen to 
name only three in support of its claim to representational standing. 
There is no question that those three members have shown suffi- 
cient injury in fact to show standing in this action. Therefore, CBF 
may proceed in this action as representative of those members.42 
Given the hostility of courts after Morton to recognize eneon-  
mental organizations' standing to represent their own interests, and 
the relative receptivity of the court to claims of individual standing by 
these organizations' members, it is hardly surprising that organiza- 
tional environmental plaintiffs grew to rely exclusively on representa- 
tional standing. Most of the larger national and regional organiza- 
tions needed only to search their membership lists to find members 
who recreated along or near the environmental resource in question, 
and get that member to agree to submit an affidavit for standing pur- 
poses. The member's participation posed little burden. With such a 
low threshold to establish individual environmental injury, the nature 
40. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 E.2d 57,61(2d Cir. 1985). 
41. See Sierra Club v. S i  Indus., 847 E.2d 1109,1112 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1988). 
4 2  Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 E. Supp. at 445. 
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of the member's interest was rarely an issue for intensive discovery or 
trial. 
As the law of environmental standing matured, however, the 
threshold for individual standing and the burden on the organization 
and its members to establish representational standing began to in- 
crease. 
C. Ruts and Potholes o n  the Representational Standing Detour 
During the 1980s, several major environmental organizations 
embarked on systematic programs to enforce Clean Water Act per- 
mits pursuant to the Clean Water Act citizen-suit provisions. The 
litigation that ensued produced many decisions that refined the re- 
quirements for the representational standing test. By the end of the 
decade, faced with increasingly sophisticated challenges to plaintiffs' 
standing in these enforcement initiatives, the courts began to tighten 
the standards for establishing both individual and representational 
standing. Courts began to inquire into the organizational relationship 
between the plaintiff organization and its members.43 At the same 
time, instead of simply requiring a showing of recreational use of the 
environmental resource in question, courts began to require a show- 
ing of specific, observable impacts to the resource.44 
1. Judicial Inquiry into Organizational Structure 
Environmental plaintiffs' reliance on representational standing 
invited judicial inquiry into their organizational structure and repre- 
sentative capacity. Organizational plaintiffs were faced with discov- 
ery demands for affected members.45 While the Supreme Court had 
previously held membership lists to be protected by the First 
~mendment: and organizations were interested in protecting the 
privacy of their members, defendants were nonetheless entitled to 
discover before trial which members an organizational plaintiff in- 
tended to rely on to establish  tand ding.^' At least one court resolved 
the issue by accepting affidavits from affected members under seal.4s 
43. See infra Part I.C.1. 
44. See infra Part I.C.2. 
45. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862,865 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), a f d ,  747 
F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984). 
46. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,459 (1958). 
47. See FED. R. CN. P. 26(a)(3). 
48. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440,446 (D. 
Md. 1985) (finding that NRDC did have representational standing even though it chose not to 
publicly release the names of all its affected members). 
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More fundamentally, courts began inquiring into the exact cor- 
porate structure of these organizational plaintiffs. Following deci- 
sions in other contexts, some commentators suggested that an organi- 
zation may sue on behalf of its members only if it can establish that 
the putative members had some form of control over the activities of 
the organization.49 The Ninth Circuit followed this reasoning and re- 
jected a claim of organizational standing in an environmental case 
where the corporate plaintiff was organized as a non-membership 
corporation, with no voting members? The Northern District of New 
York, on the other hand, rejected a challenge to Sierra Club's organ- 
izational capacity to represent impacted members even though those 
members constituted a very small minority of its national member- 
ship, reasoning that the requisite control of the organization need not 
be actual majority control so long as the represented members had 
some voice in the organization's governance.'' 
These authorities invited factual and legal inquiry into the exact 
structure of corporate governance of environmental plaintiff organi- 
zations. In one case, a district court conducted a three-day trial in- 
quiring into the organizational structure of plaintiff Friends of the 
Earth (FOE), and concluded that FOE'S failure to adopt formal crite- 
ria for membership qualification precluded its acting in a representa- 
tive capacity on behalf of its putative rnember~.'~ The Fifth Circuit 
reversed, finding su£€icient indicia of membership to support repre- 
sentational standing under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertis- 
ing Cornrnis~ion.~~ Other courts have similarly found sufficient repre- 
sentational capacity based on a finding of de facto membership 
control of the organization." Recent commentary suggests that an 
49. See, e.g., JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW 21 (1987); MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN 
SUITS 6.07(C) at 6-32 (1995) (citing Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 
1979)). 
50. See Pacific Legal Found., Inc. v. Gorsuch, 18 ERC (BNA) 1127 (9th Cu. 1982). 
51. See Sierra Club v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 585 F. Supp. 842 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
52  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 919 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Tex. 
1996), rev'd, 129 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 1997). 
53. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
54. See Public Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F3d 
111 (3d Cu. 1997); Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986 F. 
Supp. 1406,1409 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding "de facto membership organization"). 
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inquiry into the corporate governance of plaintiff organizations 
should remain an essential element of representational  tand ding.^' 
These inquiries into the membership lists and corporate govern- 
ance are at a minimum burdensome, and at worst, fatal to the organi- 
zation's standing. Yet, often these organizational standing burdens 
pale in comparison to the ever-elevating hurdle to establish standing 
for individual members in the first place. 
2. The Rising Bar of Individual Injury in Fact 
As noted, the early decisions in environmental enforcement suits 
established a relatively light burden for showing individual member 
standing. An affidavit stating that members of the organization used 
the affected resource usually s~fficed.'~ However, courts have begun 
requiring increasingly specific showings of objective environmental 
harm. As a result, reliance on members' claims of individual injury 
has become increasingly tenuous. 
The first hint of increasing judicial scrutiny into members' claims 
of individual injury came in a Third Circuit case, Public Interest Re- 
search Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell-Du.yn Terminals, I ~ C . ~  
In Powell-Duflyn, the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) 
brought a citizen suit to enforce Clean Water Act permit require- 
ments against an industrial discharger. PIRG7s complaint alleged 
generally that it had members who resided andlor recreated on or 
near the Kill Van Kull, the affected water body. When the defendant 
moved to dismiss for lack of standing, PIRG amplified these allega- 
tions with more specific affidavits, including affidavits of members 
who hiked, jogged, or birdwatched along the Kill Van Kull and spe- 
cifically complained about the brown color, foul odor, and oily sheens 
in the water." The Third Circuit upheld the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in PIRG7s favor on standing and liability. In do- 
ing so, however, it specifically rejected the claim that any water pollu- 
tion in violation of the Clean Water Act constituted an injury in fact 
to recreational users of the water body, and instead required the 
plaintiff to establish specific, objective injuries suffered by its mem- 
bers as a result of water pollution. The aesthetic injuries averred in 
55. See generally Charles H .  Steen & Michael B. Hopkins, Corporate Governance Meets the 
Constitution: A Case Study of Nonprofit Membership Corporations and Their Associational 
Standing Under Article ZZZ,17 REV. LITIG. 209 (1998). 
56. See MILLER, supra note 49, at 21-22. 
57. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). 
58. See id. at 71. 
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the plaintiffs7 affidavits-foul odors, brown color, and oily sheens- 
were held to be sufficient.'' 
The Third Circuit went on to establish a practical approach to 
the "causation" prong of the Article 111 standing test. This approach 
is to consider whether the specific pollutants complained of are gen- 
erally capable of causing the alleged harms, without requiring proof 
that the specific pollution coming out of the defendant's pipe was the 
sole cause of the harm.@ Although this decision was a short-term vic- 
tory for environmental plaintiffs, as it upheld PIRG's standing and es- 
tablished a workable test for causation, the Powell-Duffryn decision 
also had the effect of raising the bar for individual environmental 
standing. No longer would a simple allegation that a plaintiff's mem- 
bers recreated on or near the affected resource suffice to establish 
injury. Now plaintiffs would be required to establish specific observ- 
able impacts of pollution before they could sue. The Powell-Duffryn 
standard was swiftly adopted by other federal courts.61 
In the early 1990s, two Supreme Court decisions led the way to 
further restrictions on environmental representational standing. In 
Lujan v. National Wildlife ~ederation: the Court rejected statutory 
standing on the part of an organization whose members claimed to 
use Forest Service lands in the vicinity of a vast area of federal lands 
opened up for mineral development. Here standing was rejected be- 
cause the plaintiff failed to establish that its members recreated on 
any of the lands actually opened for development.63 In Lujan v. De- 
fenders of Wildlife (Lujan)? the Court rejected Article 111 standing in 
a case brought under the Endangered Species Act, even though the 
plaintiff's members had professional or avocational interests in par- 
ticular endangered species that might be impacted by United States 
funding of certain development projects abroad. In Lujan, the basis 
for rejection was that individual members could not identify any spe- 
cific plans to visit the affected venues in the future.6s 
59. Seeid. 
60. See id. at 73. 
61. See, e.g., Save Our Community v. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992); Natural Re- 
sources Defense Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992); Concerned Area Residents 
for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 34 
F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994). 
62. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
63. See id. at 889. 
64. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
65. See id. at 564. 
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Neither of these cases represented a dramatic departure from 
previous environmental standing doctrine on their facts; after all, the 
Sierra Club v. Morton decision had long ago required that environ- 
mental plaintiffs demonstrate that they themselves be "among the 
injured."@ Individuals who cannot establish any physical proximity to 
threatened environmental resources, not surprisingly, are not "among 
the injured." Nevertheless, the tone of Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion in Lujan sent shock waves through the environmental plain- 
tiffs' community and led many commentators to question the contin- 
ued viability of the federal environmental citizen In his rejec- 
tion of standing based on the theory of the entire world as one inter- 
linked ecosystem, Justice Scalia wrote that the Endangered Species 
Act could not create rights "in persons who have not been injured in 
fact, that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly 
affected by the unlawful action in que~tion."~ 
It is this language requiring "perceptible" injury that has led 
many lower federal courts to dramatically tighten previously liberal 
standards for establishing environmental "injury in fact." A case in 
the Third Circuit that bracketed the Lujan decision presents the most 
dramatic example of this change in judicial winds. PIRG brought a 
Clean Water Act permit enforcement suit against a chemical manu- 
66. See 405 U.S. 727,735 (1972). 
67. See generally Charles A. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest: How the Citizens Suit 
Provision 0-fthe Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 
VA. L. REV. 1957 (1995); Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect of Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife and the Role of Citizen Suits in Environmental Enforcement, 19 COLUM. J. E m .  L. 
141 (1994); Robert B. June, Citizen Suits: The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen 
Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. 761 (1994); Harold J. Krent & Ethan 
G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MCH. L. REV. 1793 (1993); Cass R. 
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111,991 M a  L. 
REV. 163 (19%); Robert Wiygul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later: Proving Jurisdiction and Article 
IIZ Standing in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8 TUL. ENVTL. LJ. 435 (1995); Matthew M. 
Werner, Note, Mootness and the Citizen Suit Civil Penalty Claims Under the Clean Water Act: A 
Post-Lujan Reassessment, 25 ENVTL. L. 801 (1995); Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural 
Injury Standing after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275 (1995). For an 
analysis of the assertion that standing based solely on use of the affected resource remains vi- 
able after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, see Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean 
Water Act stinding in Light of Lujan v. Defenders of wildlife, 22 &UM. J. ENVIZ. L. 169 
(1997). 
68. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566. Justice Scalia's emphasis on "perceptible" injury is tem- 
pered somewhat by Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion (joined by Justice Souter), which spe- 
cifically recognized the power of Congress "to define injuries and articulate chains of causation 
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before." Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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facturing facility, Magnesium Elektron, Inc. (MEI).~' Early in the liti- 
gation, PIRG sought a declaratory judgment to establish that it had 
standing and that ME1 had violated its water permit.70 It supported 
this motion with affidavits from its members, which established that 
they made recreational use of waters downstream of MEI's discharge, 
including the Delaware River, and that their enjoyment of these wa- 
ters was diminished by the knowledge that the River contained pol- 
lutants. The District Court granted PIRG's motion in an opinion is- 
sued before Lujan, declaring that it had standing on the basis of these 
a££idavit~.~I The Third Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal and af- 
firmed without opinion." The case proceeded to trial on the issue of 
appropriate penalties, the issues of standing and liability having al- 
ready been determined. 
At trial, PIRG sought penalties under the Clean Water Act 
based on the money saved by non-compliance and the defendants' 
lack of efforts to comply.73 ME1 defended by presenting expert testi- 
mony that the quantities of the pollutants in question (primarily total 
organic carbon and chlorides) would not cause any perceptible impact 
either on the creek into which they were discharged or downstream in 
the Delaware River. Believing the issue of standing to have been set- 
tled in its favor, PIRG did not present new scientific testimony in re- 
buttal." The District Court awarded penalties and attorneys fees. 
ME1 appealed to the Third Circuit. 
The Third Circuit vacated the judgment and directed a dismissal 
of the complaint for lack of a justiciable contr~versy.~' Relying on 
Lujan, the Court ruled that the unopposed scientific testimony of lack 
of perceptible harm to the receiving waters precluded the existence of 
a "case or contr~versy."~~ Despite its earlier a h a t i o n  of the plain- 
tWs standing, the court reasoned that the "law of the case" doctrine 
could not preclude the reopening of jurisdictional issues such as 
- - - -- - - - 
69. See Public Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 34 ERC 
(BNA) 2077 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 983 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1992). 
70. See id. at 2079-80. 
71. See id. at 2080-81. 
7 2  See 983 F2d 1052. 
73. See Public Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 40 ERC 
(BNA) 1917 (D.NJ. 1995) (relying on the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (1994)). 
74. See id. 
75. See Public Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 
111 (3d Cir. 1997). 
76. See id. at 121. 
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standingn The court refused even to remand the case to allow the 
plaintiff to present further evidence of actual harm to the receiving 
water body.78 
Other post-Lujan cases have similarly raised the bar required to 
establish individual injury in fact. The Fourth Circuit recently re- 
jected claims of standing in a Clean Water Act enforcement case 
against a copper smelter even though the plaintiffs included both a 
canoe guide who depended on clean water downstream of the plant 
to run his guiding business, and the owner of a lake located down- 
stream of the plant who limited swimming and fish consumption be- 
cause of his concerns about pollution.79 The Fourth Circuit reasoned 
that, although the copper smelter admitted to discharges of copper 
and other heavy metals in excess of its permit limits, the plaintiffs had 
not established that metals concentrations in the river and lake were 
higher than levels found e l s e ~ h e r e . ~  
Compared to the aEdavits found sufficient in early Clean Water 
Act citizens enforcement cases, the burdens imposed by the Third 
Circuit in Magnesium Elektron and the Fourth Circuit in Gaston 
Copper are nearly insurmountable. Under these cases, the threshold 
question of environmental standing would require detailed (and ex- 
pensive) scientific analysis of ambient water quality, "natural" condi- 
tions, and the relationship between pollutant discharges and "percep- 
tible" impacts on water quality. Commentators and the media have 
noted this most recent judicial trend making citizen enforcement 
more diffi~ult.~' 
3. Laidlaw: The Detour Takes Another Turn 
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court seems to have 
halted the trend away from representational standing with its decision 
in Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, ~nc." In 
Laidlaw, the Court emphasized that the touchstone of environmental 
standing is not injury to the environmental resource, but injury to the 
77. See id. at 117. 
78. See id. at 126 (Lewis, J., dissenting because PIRG was not on notice that standing re- 
mained an issue). 
79. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Co., 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 
1999), rev'd en banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000). 
80. See id. at 113-14. 
81. See William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool is Being Upset by Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5,1999, at Al;  John D. Echevema &Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion 
of Citizen "Standing" to Sue and Enforce Environmental Law at 1 (Envtl. Policy Project, 
Georgetown University Law Ctr., June 1999). 
82. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
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individual plaintiff. This individual injury may be established by 
showing a reasonable concern for the effects of environmental pollu- 
tion, without showing a demonstrable injury to the resource itselfa3 It 
remains to be seen how the lower federal courts will implement the 
Supreme Court's approach to injury in fact in laid la^.^^ At a mini- 
mum, the Gaston Copper and Magnesium Elektron decisions seem 
unsupportable in light of Laidlaw. 
If Laidlaw does not effect a shift in the courts' recent interpreta- 
tion of "injury in fact," increased judicial scrutiny into organizational 
structure, and the rising bar for individual standing may merit recon- 
sideration of reliance on an organization's representational standing. 
Regardless, the untested question remains: how can a corporate en- 
tity establish an environmental interest in a resource that is somehow 
greater, and more cognizable for Article I11 purposes, than the sum of 
the individual interests of its members? 
Unlike environmental not-for-profit groups, business corpora- 
tions have not suffered fiom the handicap of having to establish the 
individual standing of their shareholders, or their capacity to repre- 
sent these shareholders. While environmental not-for-profit corpora- 
tions have struggled to identify individual members who can satisfy 
the ever-increasing threshold for individual standing, businesses 
seeking to litigate environmental issues have enjoyed ever-easier ac- 
cess to the courts. 
11. BUSINESS INTERESTS ON THE STANDING SUPERHIGHWAY 
At the same time as the bars to individual standing have been in- 
creasing, Courts have been increasingly receptive to standing for 
business corporations, usually brought to challenge environmentally 
protective measures rather than to enforce them. While one early 
commentator suggested that "[rlegardless of how the issue of injury is 
resolved, for profit corporations have difficulty with standing because 
of the zone of interest test,"" this did not prove to be the case. The 
83. See id. at 181. 
84. This article was conceived and largely written prior to the announcement of the Laid- 
law decision. Obviously, if the Court's new approach to injury in fact is applied by the lower 
federal courts, many of the recent impediments to environmental organizations' standing will be 
removed. Nevertheless, the question of organizational capacity, as well as the di£Eiculties of lo- 
cating individual members willing to expose themselves to the rigors of litigation will continue 
to hamper organizations seeking to assert environmental interests. 
85. See MnLER, supra note 49, at 24. Under the "zone of interests" test, courts would not 
recognize a plaintiffs' standing unless the interests they sought to assert were within the "zone 
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Supreme Court recently decided, in Bennett v. Spear: that the "zone 
of interests" test does not apply to most of the citizens enforcement 
provisions of the federal environmental laws.87 The resulting doctrine 
puts businesses asserting rights to exploit natural resources at a dis- 
tinct advantage in the courts over individuals who seek to protect 
such resources. 
Although a few decisions have revealed doubt about the standing 
of business corporations to assert rights under the environmental 
statutes: the distinct trend has been towards recognizing economic 
injury as a basis for standing to litigate environmental issues. Thus, 
courts have allowed potential contractors and housing developers to 
enforce Clean Water Act permit provisions requiring sewage treat- 
ment plant upgrades." Another court recognized the right of an elec- 
tric utility to bring a Clean Air Act citizen suit challenging a potential 
co-generation facility that would eat into its rate base." In a more re- 
cent case, the Ninth Circuit recognized the right of electrical utilities 
to enforce the consultation requirement of the Endangered Species 
Act: even though their only interest in the endangered salmon in- 
volved was to avoid further flow requirements that would affect their 
hydroelectric power costs.92 
The culmination of this trend towards liberalized business 
standing to assert environmental claims was the Supreme Court's de- 
cision in Bennett v. Spear. The prior cases had recognized standing on 
the part of businesses whose economic interests happened to coincide 
with enforcement of the environmental protections at issue. In 
Bennett, the Court recognized business interests' standing to enforce 
the procedural provisions of environmental statutes even where those 
of interests" protected by the underlying statute. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri- 
cans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 465,474-475 (1982). 
86. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
87. See id. at 162. 
88. See Citizens Coordinating Cornm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. Washington Metro. 
Area Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1 1 6 9 ( ~ . ~ .  Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of environmental injury by a 
business corporation); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cu. 1979). 
89. See Locust Lane v. Swatara Township Auth., 636 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding 
that developers precluded from building on their property due to failure of a pollution control 
plant to comply with a permit had standing to sue under the Clean Water Act); Michigan v. City 
of Allen Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (finding contractors had standing to bring 
suit against city under the Clean Water Act). 
90. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty Invs. Assocs., 524 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(denying award of attorney's fees and recognizing claim under the Clean Air Act was not frivo- 
lous). 
91. 16 U.S.C. 0 1536(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
92. See Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cu. 1994). 
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interests were directly contrary to the environmental values the stat- 
utes sought to protect. The Bennett plaintiffs consisted of ranchers 
and irrigation districts that protested a biological opinion given by the 
National Marine Fisheries Service under section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act? The opinion required minimum reservoir levels as a 
means of protec4hg endangered fish, the Lost River sucker and the 
shortnose sucker, in certain  reservoir^.^' The ranchers claimed that 
this biological opinion, the effect of which would be to deprive them 
of water they wished to use in their ranching businesses, violated sec- 
tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act in that it constituted a de facto 
critical habitat designation without the consideration of economic im- 
pacts required by section 4(b)(2) of the Act." 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court quickly disposed of any 
"zone of interests" objection to the ranchers' standing to assert their 
competing claim to the water needed by shortnose and Lost River 
suckers under the Endangered Species Act. The Court reasoned that 
the "zone of interest" test was a prudential limitation on standing, not 
grounded in the Constitutional "case or controversy" requirement, 
and that Congress intentionally abrogated the "zone of interests" test 
by authorizing a suit to enforce the Endangered Species Act by "any 
person.'796 The Court barely paused to find that the rancher plaintiffs 
satisfied the "injury in fact" requirement of Article 111 of the Consti- 
tution, holding an allegation that the effect of the biological opinion 
would be to reduce the water available for their ranching business to 
be sufficient." 
While perhaps not surprising as a matter of statutory interpreta- 
tion and constitutional standing doctrine, the impact of the Bennett 
decision is jarring. Bennett flings open the courthouse doors to busi- 
ness interests seeking to exploit the environmental resources needed 
by endangered species to survive shortly after the same Court effec- 
tively slammed the doors on those seeking to assert the interests of 
the endangered species themselves, in Lujamg8 It will always be easier 
for businesses to establish their economic interests in exploitation of 
93. See 520 U.S. at 159. 
94. See id. 
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994). 
96. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165-66 (citing ESA, 16 U.S.C. 5 1540(g)) (distinguishing citi- 
zen-suit provisions such as the provision in the Clean Water Act, which limits the citizens 
authorized to sue to those "having an interest which is or may be adversely affected!' 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365 (g)). 
97. See id. at 167-168. 
98. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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environmental resources than for individuals to establish the "percep- 
tible," "individualized" injury in fact resulting from a reduction in 
species abundance or an incremental loss of environmental resources. 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the relative ease with 
which business interests may assert standing in environmental cases is 
a Clean Air Act case decided a few years ago in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. In Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill 
Co.," individuals as well as the corporate owner of a competing land- 
fill challenged the development of a new landfill without obtaining an 
air quality new source permit that would require offsetting emissions 
reductions, including reductions of ozone precursors. The individual 
plaintiffs alleged that they lived and recreated in the region whose air 
quality was affected by emissions from the landfill. This air quality 
region was in non-attainment for the national ambient air quality 
standard for ozone-i.e., the air in this region violated the standards 
set by EPA based on health impacts from ozone. The individual 
plaintiffs alleged that they were concerned about the health impacts 
of recreating in areas with excess ozone, and submitted expert testi- 
mony establishing that their health concerns were reas~nable.'~ 
Nevertheless, the court rejected the individual claims of standing: 
[W]e believe the Individual Plaintiffs fall short of establishing that 
their alleged injuries are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the first 
prong of the standing test. The Individual Plaintiffs offer no evi- 
dence regarding the magnitude of the diminished air quality nor the 
specific direct effect, if any, that this diminished air quality will 
have on their health, environmental and recreational interests. 
From the fact that the air quality in the geographical area sur- 
rounding the landfill would have been better had Defendant ob- 
tained a Part D permit, Individual Plaintiffs summarily conclude 
that their health, environmental and recreational interests suffer 
injury, without filling in the blanks.'01 
The Court went on, however, to find that the corporate landfill owner 
had standing to assert the Clean Air Claims, holding that the competi- 
tive economic injury that would result from the opening of a new 
landfill easily satisfied the injury in fact standard of Article I11 stand- 
ing.''' 
As the law of environmental standing has thus developed, indi- 
viduals and not-for-profits who band together to assert environmental 
99. 911 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
100. See id. at 870. 
101. Id. at 869-70. 
102. See id. at 871. 
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causes tend to fall short of establishing sufficient "injury" even with 
expert testimony concerning health impacts of environmental pollu- 
tion, while business corporations may establish injury with mere alle- 
gations of potentially lost profits. This stark dichotomy between the 
treatment of not-for-profit corporations asserting environmental in- 
terests and business corporations asserting financial interests may 
seem natural to late twentieth-century sensibility. The pursuit of fi- 
nancial profit seems to us the natural function of the corporate form; 
profit is about money; money is the ultimate property; and litigation 
about property rights seems to be now (and therefore must always 
have been) the quintessential "case or controversy" for judicial reso- 
lution. 
In this view, pursuit of money is natural for a corporation while 
pursuit of community values, such as environmental integrity, is un- 
natural. As one court put it, in rejecting a business corporation's 
claim of standing to object to pollution of the groundwater underlying 
its mall on aesthetic grounds: 
Though a corporation is a person for some purposes, we would be 
most reluctant to hold that it has senses and so can be affronted by 
deteriorations in its environment. That is beyond the reach of legal 
fiction and belongs in the realm of poetic license.'" 
As it turns out, however, this late twentieth century sensibility is his- 
torically inaccurate, and might have been somewhat surprising to the 
drafters of the "case or controversy" clause of Article 111 of the Con- 
stitution. 
111. THE CORPORATE VEHICLE ON THE ROAD, HISTORICALLY 
Can a corporation have a direct interest in the environmental in- 
tegrity of a natural resource akin to a natural person's aesthetic inter- 
ests? The District of Columbia Circuit, in Friendship Heights, em- 
phatically said no. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
acknowledged that corporate "persons" have rights and interests that 
go beyond their financial and material interests. Thus, in First Na- 
tional Bank of Boston v. Bell~tti, '~ the Supreme Court recognized the 
right of business corporations to freedom of speech, specifically in- 
cluding speech on political matters not affecting their financial inter- 
103. Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area 
Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cu. 1985) (citing MACLEISH, COLLECTED POEMS 
1917-1952 22 (1952)). 
104. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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ests.'" If a corporation has a right to have political opinions apart 
from its financial interests, and to enforce this right in federal court, 
why may it not also have an interest in environmental well-being cog- 
nizable by the same federal courts? 
In fact, the business corporation, founded and organized around 
financial profit, is a relatively recent development in the history of the 
corporate "person." Early corporations, up to and including the time 
of the framing of the Constitution, were much more likely to have 
been chartered for religious or quasi-governmental purposes, such as 
education or public works development, than for profit. Business 
corporations, chartered for profit-making purposes, did not become 
commonplace until the nineteenth century. While some early corpo- 
rations organized for public works endeavors were incidentally quite 
profitable to their members, the concept of a corporation organized 
primarily to make money would have been just as alien to the framers 
as one organized primarily to assert environmental values. 
A. Of Corporations Ecclesiastical and Civil, Aggregate and Sole 
At the time of the framing of the Constitution and its "case or 
controversy" requirement, the corporate entity was a very different 
creature than currently perceived. A contemporaneous treatise of the 
British law of corporations authored by Stewart Kydlo6 describes and 
classifies the typical corporations of the times in terms that do not in- 
clude either the modern day business corporation, nor for that matter, 
the modern day public interest organization. 
Kyd describes the development of the corporate form as "collec- 
tive bodies of men" that formed as an outgrowth of existing comrnu- 
nities: "At the first introduction, they were little more than an im- 
provement on the communities which had grown up imperceptibly, 
without any positive institution . . . ."lo7 Kyd provides an essential 
definition of the corporate form: 
A corporation then, or a body politic, or body incorporate, is a col- 
lection of many individuals, united into a body, under a special de- 
nomination, having a perpetual succession under an artificial form, 
and vested, by policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in sev- 
eral respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting 
property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of 
105. See id. at 795 (invalidating a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from 
spending money to influence ballot referendum issues other than those that affected the corpo- 
ration's business interests). 
106. STEWART KYD, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (photo. reprint 1978) (1793). 
107. See id. at 2. 
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enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a 
variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the 
design of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it, either at 
the time of its creation, or at any subsequent period of its exis- 
tence.las 
The corporate form was thus defined by the attributes of perpetual 
succession combined with the powers to take and grant property, con- 
tract, and to sue and be sued, as well as to exercise those political 
rights defined in its charter. 
The 1793 treatise also describes various classes and distinctions 
of then contemporary corporations. It classifies corporations into 
"corporations sole" and "corporations aggregate." Corporations sole 
were those that provided perpetual succession to an office held by 
one single individual; these corporations sole included "the King, 
archbishops, certain deans, and prenedaries, all archdeacons, parsons, 
and vicars. . . ."log Corporations aggregate were those more currently 
familiar entities that consisted of a group of individuals banded to- 
gether for a common purpose. Kyd further classifies corporations as 
either ecclesiastical or lay; ecclesiastical corporations being "those of 
which not only are the members spiritual persons, but of which the 
object of the institution is also spiritual . . . ."'lo 
All other corporations are lay corporations, which, according to 
Kyd, are "again subdivided into two class, eleemosynary and civil.""' 
Eleemosynary corporations were those "constituted for the perpetual 
distribution of the free alms, or the bounty of the founder of them, to 
such purposes as he has directed."l12 The chief examples Kyd pro- 
vides of such eleemosynary corporations are hospitals for the poor 
and educational institutions. The treatise then describes by example 
the various purposes of the civil (non-eleemosynary) lay corporation: 
Civil corporations are established for a variety of temporal pur- 
poses. Thus a corporate capacity is given to the King, to prevent, in 
general, the possibility of an interregnum or vacancy of the throne, 
and to preserve entire the possessions of the crown; for immedi- 
ately on the demise of one King, his successor is in full possession 
of the regal rights and dignity[]. Other civil corporations are estab- 
lished for the purpose of local government, such as the corporations 
of cities and towns, under the names of Mayor and Commonalty, 
Bailiffs and Burgesses, and other familiar denominations; and to 
108. Id. at 13 (italics in original). 
109. See id. at 20. 
110. See id. at 22. 
111. See id. at 25 (italics in original). 
112 Seeid. 
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this class seem properly to belong the general corporate bodies of 
the two universities. . . . Other corporations are established for the 
maintenance and regulation of some particular object of public 
policy; such as the Corporation of the Trinity House for regulating 
navigation[], the Bank, and the different Insurance Companies in 
London; others for the regulation of trade, manufactures, and 
commerce, such as the East India Company, and the companies of 
trades in London and other towns; others for the improvement of 
s[]cience in general, or some particular branches if it. . . ; the Soci- 
ety of Antiquarians for promoting the study of antiquities; and the 
Royal Academy of Arts for cultivating painting and s [ ] c~ l~ tu re .~ '~  
Starkly absent from this bestiary of lgh century corporate crea- 
tures is any animal resembling either the modem day business corpo- 
ration or the modern day environmental organization. Certainly, the 
business corporation had its ancestors in such entities as the 
"Bank, . . . Insurance Companies . . .[, and] the East India Com- 
pany."l14 But the primary purpose of these entities, at least according 
to the leading contemporary treatise writer, was the accomplishment 
of some particular public policy or regulation of commerce, not profit 
for its own sake. Presumably these entities had some corporate inter- 
est in the public policy or regulation in question, independent of its 
attachment to some property interest. Similarly, there is no close 
relative of the modern day environmental advocacy organization on 
this list. Such organizations do not distribute alms or bounty to the 
poor (and thus do not fall within the class of eleemosynary institu- 
tions); they would seem to be more closely descended from a variety 
of other "civil" corporations, including both the municipal, and "sci- 
entific" ones.l15 And, finally, contrary to the suggestion of the latter- 
day Friendship Heights court, assertion of aesthetic interests is not 
Y Y  116 necessarily in the realm of "poetic license. Ecclesiastical corpora- 
tions in existence at the time of the Constitution's framing were rou- 
tinely organized for equally abstract "spiritual" purposes.117 
It appears, then, that both the modern day business corporation 
and the modern day environmental advocacy organizations de- 
113. Id. at 28-29. 
114. Id. 
115. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Law and an Agenda for Refonn, 
34 EMORY L.J. 617,631 (1985) (describing the origins of the American charitable corporation, 
and noting that the colonial charitable corporation derived from the same corporate family as 
religious and business corporations). 
116. See Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. Washington Metro. 
Area Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1169,1173 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
117. See Fishman, supra note 116, at 631. 
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scended from the same branch of the corporate family. A scholarly 
study of the development of business corporations and not-for-profit 
corporations bear this family history out. 
B. The Recent Development of the Business Corporation as an 
Oflshoot of Public Works Corporations 
A 1982 monograph by Professor Ronald Seavoy studies the de- 
velopment of the American business corporation, focusing on the ex- 
perience in New York State from 1784 to 1855."' Business corpora- 
tions and benevolent corporations developed concurrently, and 
neither had strong antecedents during colonial times. Seavoy de- 
scribes American corporation law as being wholly "indigenous," that 
is, drawing very little from British corporation law and developing 
wholly independently from British law."' Key to the rapid rise in the 
American business corporation was the enactment of general corpo- 
ration statutes, which were first provided for benevolent corporations, 
and later expanded to include business corporations as well. 
Seavoy describes five phases of the development of corporation 
law in New Y~rk."~ In the first phase, individual charters were 
granted. The second phase was the enactment of general incorpora- 
tion laws providing for the automatic incorporation of benevolent or- 
ganizations (initially churches). The third phase consisted of general 
regulatory statutes setting forth the powers and restrictions on incor- 
poration for specified classes of business corporations involved in im- 
plementing public improvements, such as turnpike corporations. 
These general statutes still required individual legislative action to in- 
corporate each business. The fourth phase consisted of general in- 
corporation statutes allowing for incorporation of specific businesses 
without individual legislative charter (but still restricted to the speci- 
fied classes of businesses). The fifth and final phase consisted of the 
enactment of general incorporation statutes for any legitimate busi- 
ness without legislative intervention. 
Throughout this development of corporation law no great dis- 
tinction was drawn between benevolent corporations and the nascent 
public improvement businesses. According to Professor Seavoy, 
A turnpike and church building were both visible and useful public 
improvements and all communities needed them. A turnpike was a 
business corporation that was undertaken for private profit, but be- 
118. See SEAVOY, supra note 7. 
119. See id. at 46. 
120. See id. at 5-7. 
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cause, in the eyes of the community, it performed a vital public 
service (as important as religious instruction), the state legislatures 
during the early national period gave equal encouragement to both 
forms of corporations as a matter of public policy; one by general 
incorporation statute and the other by a general re~ulatory statute 
coupled with the pro forma passage of all charters.'* 
Instead of distinguishing between benevolent corporations and busi- 
ness corporations, early American law drew a distinction between 
municipal corporations, which held public office consonant with their 
corporate title, and "private corporations," which included those that 
were constructing public improvements for profit as well as those that 
were providing public benefits without profit. 
This development of American corporation law, which took 
place during the early national period, after the framing of the Consti- 
tution, was of domestic origin. As Professor Seavoy notes, the 
American nation had little need for many of the corporate institutions 
described by British commentators, such as the royal "corporation 
sole."'" Meanwhile, the development of institutionalized business 
corporations led the development of similar institutions in Britain by 
decades.lZ3 In sum, the United States did not inherit a common law of 
corporate powers and identity, but rather invented it to deal with the 
exigencies of a rapidly developing nation. 
C. The Grant of Sovereign Powers to Early Business Corporations 
Early American benevolent and business organizations had sev- 
eral reasons to seek the corporate form. Chief among these were the 
traditional desire to own land in a form that provided for institutional 
succession (rather than succession through the individual trustees of 
the institution), and the ability to receive bequests.lZ4 
Public improvement corporations, however, had an additional 
reason to seek the corporate charter: very often their business pur- 
pose required them to assume certain powers of the State.'" Con- 
struction of improvements such as turnpikes, railroads, and canals 
were impossible without the power of eminent domain, accordingly, 
corporate charters for these kinds of early corporate businesses al- 
lowed these corporations to assume the State's sovereign power of 
121. Id. at 6. 
122. See id. at 46. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. at 10. 
125. See id. at 5.  
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eminent domain. This is not to say that the grant of this sovereign 
power to incorporate franchisees was non-controversial; indeed, the 
gravity of the delegation of the State's eminent domain power was 
one of the chief arguments used against the creation of general incor- 
poration statutes for turnpike companies and railroads during New 
York's constitutional convention of 1846."~ Nevertheless, general 
corporation statutes providing the grant of eminent domain were 
permitted. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of dele- 
gations of the eminent domain power to private business corporations 
providing facilities, such as railroads, for the public benefit.'" This 
delegation of eminent domain authority to private corporations has 
been described as "r~utine."'~ Indeed, there does not seem to have 
been any serious question about the power of the state and federal 
governments to delegate the eminent domain power to private busi- 
ness corporations. Yet, this power of eminent domain is usually de- 
scribed as being the very essence of sovereignty; a power so wound up 
with the very nature of government that it needs no constitutional 
grant to be e~ercised.''~ 
D. The American Corporation, Article 111, and Sovereign Interests 
As the evolution of the American corporate animal shows, there 
is nothing inherently "natural" about corporations being organized 
for business pursuits, nor is there anything inherently "unnatural" 
about corporations organized for spiritual (religious) or public inter- 
est purposes. Nor did the early national period draw any great dis- 
tinction between these sorts of corporate enterprises. The corporate 
form has proven flexible, and evolved greatly in the ensuing devel- 
opment of our nation, chiefly to accommodate and encourage the 
formation and operation of business corporations. The framers 
drafted the Article III "case or controversy" requirement long before 
the corporation's metamorphosis into primarily a business organiza- 
tion. Because the implicit requirement of standing was placed in the 
constitution long before corporate interests became identified with 
business interests, there should be no reason to assume that only 
business interests can be asserted as a corporate "injury in fact." 
- 
126. See id. at 187. 
127. See, e.g., Olcott v. Fond du Lac County, 83 U.S. 678,691 (1872). 
128. See Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324,1326 (11th Cir. 1999). 
129. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Kohl v. United 
States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985). 
Heinonline - -  12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 209 2001-2002 
210 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [VoI. 12183 
Even more tantalizing to the question of standing for environ- 
mental corporations is the routine grant of sovereign state powers- 
usually the power of eminent domain-to franchise corporations. If 
the State can make a non-exclusive grant of this essential attribute of 
sovereignty to a corporation, there is no principled reason that a State 
could not also grant other sovereign interests, such as the State's sov- 
ereign interest in the purity of its air and waters, to an entity it has in- 
corporated. If a corporate entity has standing to assert eminent do- 
main rights in court, why shouldn't a corporation with explicit 
authority have standing to assert the State's sovereign environmental 
interests in court? The usefulness of such a delegation may depend, 
of course, on the extent to which the State itself has judicially cogni- 
zable interests in environmental resources that go beyond those of its 
individual citizens. 
IV. THE STANDING OF STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES TO ASSERT 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INTERESTS 
Individuals have been required to show personal use of a re- 
source and injury to that use in order to establish standing. In con- 
trast, the Supreme Court has long recognized the interest of States, as 
sovereigns, in protecting the purity of the air, water, and other envi- 
ronmental resources within its borders. This interest has been recog- 
nized wholly apart from a State's interest as property owner or as a 
representative for the interests of its citizens who use these resources. 
Indeed, in delimiting the scope of a State's capacity to sue as parens 
patriae,'30 the Court has explicitly rejected the organizational standing 
model of a state acting as representative of the individual interests of 
its citizens. Although less clear, there is also authority that munici- 
palities enjoy a similar sovereign interest in the protection of the en- 
vironment within their borders, independent of the interests of their 
residents. 
A. The State's Sovereign Interest in Clean Air and Clean Water Within 
it Borders 
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1907 in the case of Georgia v. 
131 Tennessee Copper Co., Justice Holrnes declared in sweeping terms 
the sovereign interest of a State in protecting its environment: 
130. The parens patriae doctrine, which literally means "parent of the country," allows a 
State or other sovereign to assert the interests of its citizens. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,600 (1982). 
131. 206 U.S. 230 (1907) 
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[The] State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of 
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last 
word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests 
and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might have to pay indi- 
viduals before it could utter that word, but with it remains the final 
132 power.. . . 
In Tennessee Copper, the Court recognized Georgia's right to sue a 
plant located in Tennessee to abate an air pollution nuisance, under 
the parens patriae doctrine. The Court explicitly recognized the 
quasi-sovereign right of a state to protect its natural resources on be- 
half of its citizens, even apart from any direct proprietary interest of 
the State in those resources. In other cases, the Supreme Court had 
similarly recognized the right of States, as sovereigns, to abate envi- 
ronmental hazards emanating from beyond their borders, under nui- 
sance law.133 
These cases cannot be explained simply as a form of representa- 
tional standing at the state le~e1.l~~ Though the early cases pre-date 
modern standing doctrine, a contemporary Supreme Court decision 
makes clear that, far from being an analog to representational stand- 
ing, a State's parens patriae standing is its inverse. Unlike representa- 
tional standing, which depends on the identification of an individual 
with interests that would merit individual standing, the Court has held 
that parens patriae standing depends on the assertion of quasi- 
sovereign interests that are not individuated.13' 
In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Article I11 standing of the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, acting in its parens patriae capacity, to challenge the 
practices of apple growers giving preference to foreign pickers from 
Jamaica over workers from Puerto Rico, which it alleged to be in 
violation of the Wagner-Peyser A C ~ ' ~ ~  and the Immigration and Na- 
tionality Act of 1952.lr] Far from basing this standing on the State's 
representation of the individual interests of its citizens, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the need for a State asserting parens patriae 
standiig to identify "quasi-sovereign" interests that exist apart from 
132 Id. at 237. 
133. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 
U.S. 419 (1922); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 
(1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). 
134. C' Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding that 
a state-commissioned agency may assert organizational standiig on behalf of its constituents). 
135. See Barez, 458 U.S. 592,601 (1982). 
136. 29 U.S.C. 5 49 et seq. (1994). 
137. 8 U.S.C. 5 1101 et seq. (1994). 
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any individual interests of its citizens. Referring to parens patriae 
standing, the Court opined: 
That concept does not involve the State's stepping in to represent 
the interests of particular citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot 
represent themselves. In fact, if nothing more than this is in- 
volved-i.e., if the State is only a nominal party without a real in- 
terest of its own-then it will not have standing under the parens 
patriae doctrine . . . . Rather, to have such standing the State must 
assert an injury to what has been characterized as a "quasi- 
sovereign" interest, which is a judicial construct that does not lend 
itself to a simple or exact definiti~n.'~~ 
In explaining these "quasi-sovereign7' interests, distinct from the 
interest of particular citizens, that would suffice for parens patriae 
standing, the Court provided several examples. These examples in- 
cluded the sovereign interest of a state in adopting and enforcing 
codes and regulations to apply to persons within its jurisdiction, and 
the right to demand recognition by other sovereigns. The Court em- 
phasized that these interests are not the interest of the State as an 
owner or proprietor, or of the State as representative of a particular 
individual interest: 
Interests of private parties are obviously not in themselves sover- 
eign interests, and they do not become such simply by virtue of the 
State's aiding in their achievement. In such situations, the State is 
no more than a nominal party. Quasi-sovereign interests stand 
apart from all three of the above: They are not sovereign interests, 
proprietary interests, or private interests pursued by the State as a 
nominal party. They consist of a set of interests that the State has 
in the well-being of its populace.'39 
This description of the essence of Article 111 parens patriae 
standing is the exact inverse of the Article I11 requirements articu- 
lated by the Court for individual (and representational) standing. 
The individual must show "concrete and particularized" harm.14' 
Such "particularized" harm is an anathema to parens patriae standing, 
which cannot be based on the interest of a "particular" citizen. Con- 
versely, the individual seeking standing cannot rely on "generally 
available  grievance[^],"'^' while parens patriae standing is specificaUy 
based on the generalized interest of the State "in the well being of its 
populace."142 
138. Barez, 458 U.S. at 600-01 (citation ommitted). 
139. Id. at 602. 
140. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992). 
141. See id. at 573-74. 
142. See Barez, 458 U.S. at 602. 
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Significantly, the Barez Court relied on the series of interstate 
nuisance cases discussed above to flesh out its concept of exactly what 
sorts of State interests qualified as "quasi-sovereign" interests ame- 
nable to judicial recognition under the parens patriae doctrine. Not- 
ing that these nuisance cases were "instances in which the injury to 
the public health and comfort was graphic and direct,"143 the Court 
also noted that "parens patriae interests extend well beyond the pre- 
vention of such traditional public nuisances."144 These early nuisance 
decisions, combined with the Court's explicit reference to a State's in- 
terest in the purity of its environmental resources in Barez suggest 
that States have an Article 111 parens patriae interest in preserving 
environmental resources that goes well beyond the interests required 
to establish individual standing. 
Indeed, the Court itself seems to assume the existence of auto- 
matic State standing, as a sovereign, to enforce environmental re- 
quirements with respect to resources located within its borders. In a 
case where the State of California challenged the failure of the De- 
partment of the Interior to issue a consistency determination under 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),'45 the Court found Cali- 
fornia's standing "clear" without any inquiry into "injury in fact" re- 
quirements: 
Petitioner-defendants (hereafter petitioners) state their disagree- 
ment with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's holding that 
environmental groups and local governments have standing to sue 
under CZMA § 307(c)(l), but do not challenge that standing deci- 
sion here. Since the State of California clearly does have standing, 
we need not address the standing of the other respondents, whose 
position here is identical to the 
A State's sovereign interest in the integrity of its environment is 
thus a constitutionally cognizable interest that exists independent of 
- 
143. See id. at 604. 
144. See id. at 605. 
145. 16 U.S.C. 5 1456(c)(1) (1994). 
146. Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312,319 (1984). States have similarly been 
held to be "persons" who are entitled to sue as plainti£fs under various federal citizen-suit provi- 
sions. See Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 
(1976); Massachusetts v. United States Veterans A h ,  541 F.2d 119 (1st Ci. 1976); United 
States v. City of Toledo, 867 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 
619 F2d 623 (7th Ci. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981), on 
remand, 680 F.2d 473 (7th Ci. 1982). But see United States v. City of Hopewell, 508 F. Supp. 
526 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
Heinonline - -  12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 213 2001-2002 
214 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM pol .  12183 
the sort of individualized "injury in fact" requirement applied in indi- 
vidual standing ana1y~is.l~~ 
B. Municipal Standing to Assert Environmental Interests 
Several courts have similarly recognized municipal standing to 
assert environmental interests without inquiry into individualized 
"injury in fact." One early Second Circuit case under NEPA found 
such standing without question. In a case in which a municipality 
challenged the United States Postal Service's failure to complete an 
environmental impact statement for a new postal facility that would 
result in the closing of an existing postal facility in downtown Roches- 
ter, New York, the Court emphatically upheld the standing of the 
City of Rochester to press its NEPA claims: 
The conclusion of the district court that neither the City of Roches- 
ter nor the regional planning board has standing to seek enforce- 
ment of NEPA and the ICA is out of harmony with settled law. 
Well-reasoned cases have uniformly held that a municipality has 
standing to challenge federal agency action resulting in environ- 
mental damage within the city.14' 
This holding suggests that a municipality has standing per se to 
challenge "environmental damage" within its borders. Recent cases, 
however, have applied more traditional "injury in fact" analysis to 
address the standing of municipalities. Thus, one series of cases has 
relied heavily on property ownership by municipalities in assessing 
their environmental standing.14' Another case seemed to recognize 
sufficient potential injury in the expenses a village would incur to re- 
spond to flooding that might result from a proposed project.lM 
These municipal standing cases may be significant to the ques- 
tion of corporate environmental standing, as municipalities are often 
explicitly organized as state-chartered corporate entities, and even 
147. Despite the relative clarity of these Supreme Court precedents, some courts do con- 
tinue to apply Article I11 "injury in fact" analysis to State assertions of environmental claims in 
the federal courts. See, e.g., Idaho v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 35 F.3d 585 (D.C. Ci. 
1994) (finding standing based on State ownership of lands that might be impacted by pollution); 
Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting Nevada's standing to assert claims 
under the National Environmental Policy Act with respect to studies for siting of nuclear waste 
repository within the State). 
148. City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967,972 (2d Ci. 1976) (citing 
City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Ci. 1972); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344, 
348 (D. Conn. 1972)). 
149. See Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1998); Catron County Bd. of 
Comm'rs v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F3d 1429 (10th Ci. 1996); Douglas 
County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995). 
150. See Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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when not so chartered, are usually recognized to enjoy the essential 
attributes of "corporateness."151 These more recent cases considering 
municipal standing have ignored whatever sovereign environmental 
interests municipalities may enjoy as subdivisions of the state, and 
have instead focussed on the municipalities' direct, "corporate" prop- 
erty or monetary interests. These cases may simply reflect the trend 
toward closer judicial scrutiny of environmental standing where non- 
business interests are at stake. 
Municipalities are not generally considered sovereigns, how- 
ever!'2 Their interests and powers, like those of private corporations, 
are limited to those granted by the state.''' Municipal charters do not 
typically include an explicit grant of the State's sovereign interest in 
protecting the air, lands, and waters within its boundaries. In the ab- 
sence of such a grant, there is no more reason to expect courts to rec- 
ognize such interests on the part of a municipal corporation, than for 
a private environmental corporation. This does not mean, however, 
that an explicit grant of the State's sovereign interest in protecting its 
environment to a state-chartered corporation would not be recog- 
nized for standing purposes. 
States have long been laboratories for innovations in the law of 
environmental protection. The State of Michigan adopted citizen en- 
vironmental enforcement legislation before the federal government 
did.'" This state legislation in turn inspired the federal citizen-suit 
 provision^.'^^ The recent contraction of federal standing doctrine and 
the restrictions placed on federal representational standing may pres- 
ent a similar opportunity for state legislative initiative. 
As described by Professor Seavoy, the corporate form has 
proven highly flexible throughout United States history. The corpo- 
rate vehicle evolved to meet the exigencies of an expanding, industri- 
151. See SEAVOY, supra note 7, at 21-23, see also Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the 
Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1985). 
152. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (finding that municipal corporations are not 
state sovereigns for the purposes of 1lh amendment immunity). See also Mount Healthy City 
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,280 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). 
153. See id. at 530. 
154. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, Mich. Comp. Laws $0 691.1201- 
691.1207, repealed by 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 451 (Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.1701 (2000)). 
155. See AxLnuE, supra note 49, at 5 1.02(A) at 1-5. 
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alizing nation, resulting in the genesis and evolution of the business 
corporation. The corporate form similarly evolved and was adapted 
to the needs of religious institutions and municipalities. Courts read- 
ily accepted this evolution, and did not flinch at the delegation to cor- 
porate entities of quintessentially sovereign powers such as the emi- 
nent domain power. This nation has evolved into a post-industrial 
society in which the exigencies of protecting and conserving environ- 
mental resources have replaced the exigencies of opening these re- 
sources up to exploitation. The time may be ripe for the corporate 
vehicle to evolve again, this time into an entity in which the State's 
environnzental interests are similarly delegated. 
What I propose is the creation of a new class of state-chartered 
not-for-profit corporations. Such a corporation, which might be 
dubbed a "chartered conservation corporation," would be similar to 
existing not-for-profits, with the exception that the governing statute 
would make an explicit grant of the State's sovereign interest in the 
integrity of its environmental resources. Such a grant might provide: 
In addition to the other powers and authorities granted under this 
Chapter, a Chartered Conservation Corporation shall have the 
non-exclusive right to assert before any court of competent jurisdic- 
tion the State's sovereign interests in the protection of its environ- 
mental resources, including the air, lands, forests, flora, fauna, and 
waters located within the jurisdiction of the State. This authority 
shall be limited to the enforcement of claims for injunctive relief 
and penalties payable to the treasury of the State or the United 
States under any common law claim or statute providing for a pri- 
vate right of action, but shall not extend to permit the collection of 
compensation due to the State for environmental damage. 
This grant should be available only to those not-for-profit corpo- 
rations chartered explicitly for the protection of particular environ- 
mental resources within the State.ls6 In order to ensure that chartered 
conservation corporations are truly representative, the availability of 
this status might be limited to those corporations organized as mem- 
156. In the 1990's, citizens' environmental enforcement litigation has largely devolved from 
actions instituted by national environmental organizations to claims more local and regional 
environmental organizations focused on a particular regional environmental resource such as a 
river, watershed, sound, lake, or bay. Compare MILLER, supra note 49, at 10-12 (describing 
Clean Water Act enforcement efforts by Natural Resources Defense Council), with Robert F. 
Kennedy, Jr. & Steven P. Solow, Environmental Litigation as Clinical Education. A Case Study, 
8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 319, 324 (1993) (discussing Hudson Riverkeeper organization), and 
Cronin v. Browner, 898 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (including plaintiffs Delaware 
Riverkeeper, San Francisco Baykeeper, Puget Soundkeeper, Long Island Soundkeeper, and the 
Baykeeper for the New York and New Jersey Harbor Estuary). 
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bership organizations. Opportunities for abuse should be limited, as 
the restriction against collecting damages otherwise due to the state, 
and the non-exclusive nature of the grant, should limit the opportuni- 
ties for extortionate suits or collusive settlements. 
This grant of the state's environmental interests is certainly less 
dramatic than the delegation of the sovereign power of eminent do- 
main, which is routinely accepted by courts. The eminent domain 
power, after all, carries with it the power to take private property in 
the name of the state, and to evict persons from their homes if neces- 
sary. No similar consequences flow from the proposed grant of state 
environmental protection interests. Similarly, granting a state char- 
tered corporation a direct interest in protecting the integrity of envi- 
ronmental resources is no more abstract than chartering religious 
corporations to advance religious interests. 
Nor should such an explicit delegation of the sovereign interest 
in environmental resources run afoul of the Morton Court's rejection 
of organizational standing to represent environmental concerns gen- 
erally. What the Morton and Lujan Courts emphatically rejected was 
the pursuit of environmental causes divorced from any connection to 
the tangible environmental resources affected. As the Court's most 
recent decision in Laidlaw makes clear, a legitimate interest in the af- 
fected environmental resource should suffice. One way to establish 
that interest is by showing regular use of the a£fected resource by 
members of the organization. The Court has also recognized in the 
past, however, that the State as sovereign has a direct and tangible in- 
terest in all of the environmental resources located within its borders. 
There is no reason that a State-delegated sovereign interest in the re- 
source itself should not suffice. After all, if the State has a constitu- 
tionally cognizable interest in the "purity" of its air, lands, and waters, 
there is no reason that the State may not share this interest with a 
corporate entity it has chartered, particularly one that is organized 
specifically to protect a particular environmental resource that is at 
issue in the litigation. 
If adopted, the chartered conservation corporation should put to 
rest most of the organizational and representational standing issues 
that currently plague citizens environmental enforcement litigation. 
The focus of such litigation could return to determining whether the 
defendant has violated the pertinent statutes rather than complex and 
intrusive inquiries into organizational structure, personal recreational 
habits of plaintiffs' members, and expert testimony about observable 
environmental harm or reasonable concern. 
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Although business corporations have fared far better in recent 
years in establishing standing to litigate under the federal environ- 
mental statutes, there is nothing about the inherent nature of the cor- 
porate form or its history that would lend itself to the advancement of 
business interests rather than environmental resource interests. The 
business corporation has evolved since the founding of this nation 
(and since the drafting of the case or controversy clause of the Consti- 
tution). The not-for-profit corporation might similarly evolve to as- 
sert the resource protection interests of the State. An explicit grant 
of the State's sovereign interest in environmental resource protection 
should be recognized by federal courts to give such corporations 
standing to enforce environmental protections without regard to the 
individual interests of its members. 
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